Living in Fiction by Verbin, Nehama
  357
Living in Fiction 
Nehama Verbin, Beer-Sheva 
Wittgenstein makes two rather brief comments on 
persuasion in On Certainty:  
I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special 
circumstances and been taught that the earth came into 
being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We 
might instruct him: the earth has long… etc. – We should 
be trying to give him our picture of the world. This would 
happen through a kind of persuasion. (Wittgenstein 
1972, §262). 
And 
… At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what 
happens when missionaries convert Indians). (Wittgen-
stein 1972, §612). 
In these comments, Wittgenstein seems to think of per-
suasion as having to do with a change in one’s picture of 
the world that is not brought about by the giving of reasons 
and arguments. Fiction comes to mind as a possible 
vehicle of such a change. I would like to explore some of 
the features of our encounter with fiction, and the manners 
in which that encounter can persuade and convert us.  
The paper has three parts: In the first, I shall make a few 
general comments about fiction and its defining character-
istics, using Kendall Walton’s work on representation in the 
arts. (Walton 1990). In the second part, I shall discuss two 
types of transformations that can be brought about by 
means of our encounter with fiction: one involving our 
emotions, and the other involving our beliefs. In the third 
part, I shall discuss a third type of transformation, in which 
fiction becomes subversive and functions as a vehicle of 
persuasion or conversion. I shall thereby show that conver-
sion does not require a philosophical argument for God’s 
existence or probable existence, nor does it require a 
belief in the historicity of the biblical narratives. Imagining 
them may suffice.  
1. Fiction 
Our experience of fiction as a vehicle that may challenge 
us in various manners, and may bring about a transforma-
tion in the ways in which we perceive the world and 
ourselves is a familiar one. However, the nature of such a 
change, and the manners in which it depends on our 
beliefs, emotions, and on our imagination are far from 
being clear. In his illuminating book, Mimesis as Make 
Believe, Kendall Walton explores some of the characteris-
tics of representation in the arts in a manner that can help 
us understand how the fictional can affect and transform 
what we take to be real.  
Walton construes fiction as continuous with children’s 
games of make-believe. He argues that works of fiction 
serve as props in games of make-believe, i.e., they gene-
rate or prescribe imaginings, similarly to the manners in 
which dolls and teddy bears generate imaginings in 
children’s games of make-believe. The imaginings are 
generated by means of conditional principles of genera-
tion, e.g., “let’s say that a rag doll is a baby”; these can be 
either implicit or explicit. Thus, when we read Anna Kare-
nina, the novel prescribes that we imagine a certain 
woman with various characteristics, who has an affair, is 
unhappy and commits suicide. Propositions whose 
imaginings are prescribed are fictional and the fact that a 
given proposition is fictional is a fictional truth. Thus, it is 
fictional in Anna Karenina that Anna has an affair with 
Vronsky; it is fictional that they have a daughter; it is fic-
tional that she commits suicide.  
Walton distinguishes fictionality from truth, but does not 
construe it as necessarily contrasted with it: “fictionality 
has nothing essentially to do with what is or is not real or 
true or factual” (Walton 1990, 102). He points out that 
works of fiction may be about real things and they may say 
true things about them. What characterizes works of fiction 
over and against non-fiction is that they prescribe 
imaginings and generate fictional truths. Histories and 
biographies, on the other hand, do not characteristically 
prescribe imaginings, nor do they generate fictional truths.  
What is fictional is fictional in a given fictional world. 
Fictional worlds are associated with collections of fictional 
truths. Walton distinguishes the fictional world of a work of 
art from the fictional game world of its appreciator. The 
work world includes the fictional truths that are generated 
by the work alone. The game world of the appreciator 
includes, in addition to the fictional truths generated by the 
work, fictional truths about the appreciator and his/her 
relation to the work. Thus, the appreciator’s game world of 
Anna Karenina includes fictional truths about Anna having 
an affair and being unhappy, as well as fictional truths 
about the appreciator perceiving her, worrying about her, 
and feeling sorry for her.  
Walton emphasizes that our characteristic relation to fiction 
is that of participants rather than that of distant onlookers:  
We don’t just observe fictional worlds from without. We 
live in them (…) together with Anna Karenina and Emma 
Bovary and Robinson Crusoe and the others, sharing 
their joys and sorrows, rejoicing and commiserating with 
them, admiring and detesting them ... It is this experi-
ence that underlies much of the fascination representa-
tions have for us and their power over us. (Walton 1990, 
273). 
Works of fiction, according to Walton, prescribe imaginings 
and draw us to participate in worlds of make-believe. It is 
by means of our participation in worlds of make-believe 
that we can come to feel, think and perceive differently. In 
the next section, we shall look at two dimensions of our 
participation in games of make-believe and at two types of 
transformations that our encounter with fiction may bring 
about.  
2. Transformations 
In imagining Anna Karenina, we are drawn into her world 
and characteristically imagine ourselves in relation to her: 
we may imagine hearing her, seeing her, or talking to her. 
In imagining ourselves in relation to her, we come to 
participate in her world. Participation in Anna’s world has a 
psychological component: we are moved by her sorrow 
and despair; we feel for her.  
How can we feel for a fictional character? What is the 
nature of such feelings? We must, first, distinguish 
between a fictional character and a fictitious one. A 
fictional character is one that we are to imagine by means 
Living in Fiction - Nehama Verbin 
 
 
 358 
of conditional principles of generation, in the context of a 
game of make-believe. A fictional character may or may 
not exist. A fictitious character, on the other hand, is one 
that does not exist. A fictitious character is an illusory 
being that is mistakenly believed to be real. While feeling 
for a fictitious character is either an epistemic error or a 
psychological pathology, feeling for a fictional character is 
one of the characteristic manners in which we engage with 
art. We can feel for a fictional character, e.g., Anna 
Karenina because we do not merely entertain the 
possibility that she existed and had undergone certain 
experiences. We can feel for her because we share her 
world by means of our imagination. We are moved by 
fiction because we participate in it rather than merely 
observe it from the outside. 
Walton, however, denies that we are afraid of fictional 
characters, or pity fictional characters, since fictional 
emotions lack the characteristic motivating behavior that 
he takes to be fundamental to the emotions. Fearing 
someone fictionally, for example, does not motivate the 
participant to run away, or to call the police. It merely 
causes various involuntary responses such as sweating 
and an increased heartbeat, which Walton takes to be 
insufficient for the ascription of fear. Thus, for Walton, 
being aware of various fictional truths concerning Anna 
raises fictional pity, but not real pity; we do not pity Anna; it 
is fictional that we pity her. From within the game, we can 
talk about pity. From outside of the game, we can charac-
terize such an emotion as “quasi-pity”.  
Whether or not we subscribe to Walton’s conception of 
the emotions, whether it is pity that we feel for Anna, or 
quasi-pity, it is clear that we feel for her, and that we come 
to feel for her by means of the imagination that draws us to 
participate in a game of make-believe that consists of 
Anna and ourselves. Our encounter with fictional charac-
ters has a psychological component. Fiction often 
transforms the way we feel.  
The transformation that we may undergo by means of 
our participation in a game of make-believe may extend 
beyond an affective change in our emotions; it may involve 
our beliefs too. It may have an epistemic component and 
may be described in terms of the acquisition of a new or a 
deeper kind of understanding.  
How can imaginary characters and imaginary sequences 
of events deepen our understanding of reality? How can 
they teach us anything new? Even if they expose us to 
propositions, concepts, or ideas, which are valuable or 
true, what power do they have to lead us to accept those 
concepts and ideas? What justification do they provide for 
treating such ideas as true? After all, fictional narratives do 
not provide their own justification. Without justification, 
however, they cannot be counted as knowledge. (Lamar-
que and Olsen 1994). 
Once we distinguish conceptual knowledge from empiri-
cal knowledge, and the respective procedures for the 
acquisition of each, we may begin to see why “imaginary 
cases suffice to get the mind moving over its conceptual 
map” and why “actual cases are not required to produce 
conceptual knowledge.”(Carroll 2002, 8). We may then 
appreciate the manners in which works of fiction, like the 
thought experiments that are used in our philosophical 
thinking, can deepen our conceptual understanding. 
(Carroll 2002; John 1998). 
Thus, imagining and participating in worlds of make-
believe may transform our emotional dispositions as well 
as our ways of thinking. It may “cultivate our grasp of what 
is known with finer distinctions”, and lead us to make new 
ones. (Carroll 2002, 11). Anna Karenina may transform a 
peaceful reader into a deeply agitated one. The book may 
bring one to tears. It may also challenge and perhaps even 
deepen the reader’s conceptual understanding of the 
relation (or lack of which) between various concepts, such 
as love and commitment.  
In the next section, we shall look at the manner in which 
participation in a game of make-believe can transform 
completely one’s picture of the world, and lead one to 
adopt a new set of concepts, new patterns of behavior and 
a different way of life. 
3. Conversion 
The Jesus story is a complex one. Appreciating the story 
characteristically involves imagining Jesus doing various 
things: walking around the Galilee with his disciples, 
healing the sick and the possessed; it also characteristi-
cally involves imagining ourselves in relation to Jesus: 
hearing him give his sermon, watching him go up to 
Jerusalem, hearing him pray to God, watching him being 
crucified, and hearing his final despairing words on the 
cross, “My God, my God why have you forsaken me?”  
Jesus’ story can transform the reader’s emotional 
dispositions. It may elicit a variety of intense emotions (or 
quasi-emotions), e.g., pity, anger, and despair. Moreover, 
the story may deepen the reader’s understanding. It may 
challenge and transform the reader’s understanding of the 
manner in which concepts such as “savior” and “salvation” 
can be used. Over and against the conception of the 
savior as the one who brings relief, victory, peace and 
prosperity, it presents a suffering man (rabbi/ prophet/ 
miracle-worker) who dies in shame and despair; over and 
against the notion of “salvation” as peace and glory, the 
story presents the crucifixion. The question whether the 
concepts “savior”, and “salvation” can be meaningfully 
applied in such a manner is a deep conceptual question, 
which the story raises and makes salient.  
Being transformed by the image of the suffering, humili-
ated, despairing man Jesus, on the cross, and by the 
conception of salvation that is represented by means of 
this image, one’s picture of the world may be utterly 
changed. What previously has been perceived to be real, 
what previously has been conceived of as valuable: 
freedom from pain, social status, the quest for knowledge, 
life itself, may now seem empty and meaningless. The 
pursuit of happiness, health and wealth may be replaced 
by a surrender to suffering, which may now be conceived 
of as a medium for salvation, and as the primary means of 
self-improvement that is available to human beings. 
Participation in the Jesus story may, therefore, lead one to 
feel differently and think differently, to pursue a different 
way of life, to engage in a different set of practices, and to 
employ a different set of concepts.  
Thus, the Jesus story, and the conception of salvation 
that it recommends can become subversive. Participation 
in this game of make-believe may rob the participant of a 
certain conception of reality or picture of the world around 
which her life has been previously arranged. In making this 
story her-story, the participant may deem fictitious what 
she has previously taken for real. The participant may 
come to see things in a new way. In other words, she may 
be persuaded or converted by the story.  
The transformative power of the Jesus story, like other 
stories, rests on the imaginings that it prescribes. It does 
not rest on the historicity of its characters or events; it does 
not depend on whether the events represented are 
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believed to have taken place or not. When a story 
becomes subversive, it becomes subversive, first and 
foremost, by means of one’s imagination. Belief may or 
may not follow.  
Since preachers do not ordinarily use arguments for 
God’s existence or probable existence that prescribe 
beliefs, but tell stories that prescribe imaginings, we may 
conclude that coming to faith is first and foremost coming 
to imagine, and coming to participate fully in a game of 
make-believe, or in other words, coming to live in fiction. 
Whether the fictional game of make-believe that is 
imagined is a fictitious one is a further question that I 
cannot answer.  
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